According to the response-styles theory, rumination is a cognitive response to a stressor with repetitive and self-focused attention on a negative mood state. The attentional disengagement theory (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011) highlights that attentional processes are critical underlying individual differences in ruminative thinking, such as reflective pondering and depressive brooding. Using a prospective design, the current study sought to determine whether attentional control for negative material was differently associated with brooding and reflection upon life stress. Spanning a period of three months, seventy-six never depressed undergraduate students completed a baseline measurement of attentional bias using an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task (T1) and subsequently, six weeks after T1, completed internet questionnaires during their final examinations at 4 weekly fixed moments (T2-T5). The data were analyzed with a series of multilevel regression analyses. Results revealed that the relation between stress and the use of reflective pondering is stronger when participants allocate less attention to emotional information (negative and positive stimuli). On the other hand, attentional control did not moderate the relation between stress and depressive brooding. Based on the current research findings, it might be important to train attentional control to disengage from emotional distractors, which in turn may increase the use of more self-controlling thinking in response to stress.
Increased attentional control for emotional distractors moderates the use of reflective pondering in times of life stress: A prospective study
It is well known that there are wide differences in the way people cope with stressful situations. Research shows that habitual thought processes strongly influence how individuals respond to life stress (for a review, see Watkins, 2008) , with a main focus on the effects of ruminative thinking (Thompson et al., 2010) . Rumination -defined as persistent self-focused thinking about negative moods and its causes and consequences (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993 ) -has been shown to be a remarkably good predictor of psychological distress and even of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, Lyubomirsky, 2008) .
According to the response-styles theory, rumination is a detrimental response to a stressor with repetitive and passive self-focused attention on a negative mood state (for a review, see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) . Although rumination has been strongly linked to depression, there is some debate as to whether rumination should be considered as a purely maladaptive response to stress. Based on a factor analysis, research has drawn a clear distinction between two types of rumination: depressive brooding and reflective pondering (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Joormann, Dkane, Gotlib, 2006; Takano & Tanno, 2009 ). Depressive brooding, or brooding, is defined as a passive comparison of one" s current situation with some unachieved standards (e.g. "think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better"; Treynor et al. 2003, p. 256 ) and appears to be a good predictor for prolonged negative mood (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) .
Reflective pondering, or reflection, is defined as an intentional inward focus to engage in cognitive problem-solving to alleviate one" s depressive symptoms (e.g. "analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed"; Treynor et al. 2003, p. 256) .
Although reflection is a response to life stress, it has been related to lower levels of depressive feelings over time (Treynor et al., 2003) . Moreover, Joormann et al. (2006) stated that, specifically in non depressed individuals, reflection can be considered as "adaptive" problem solving thinking that, as compared to brooding, dampens psychological distress.
The distinction between brooding and reflection has recently received increased interest in research focusing on individual differences in how individuals cope with life stress. In recent cognitive models, it has been postulated that rumination is strongly influenced by cognitive processes at the level of attention, interpretation and memory (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011) . In a new theoretical model, the attentional disengagement theory (Koster et al., 2011) , ruminative thinking styles are seen as cognitive products that are influenced by attentional control processes. More specifically, it is argued that the ability to disengage attention from negative material is crucial in predicting specific ruminative responses. That is, in order to engage in adaptive coping, emotion regulation or mood repair (inclusive reflective pondering) it is crucial to be able to disengage from negative information. If this ability is impaired, individuals are more likely to experience prolonged rumination on negative affect (brooding).
For example, a life stressor such as an argument with one" s spouse will naturally elicit negative thoughts. However, some individuals are able to call for attentional resources to reduce the distraction from these ongoing negative thoughts about one self. This successful disengagement from emotional distractions allows reflective pondering in order to (possibly) solve the problem. Indeed, it has been found that this reflective pondering can increase selfknowledge and facilitate psychological adjustment (e.g. Martin & Tesser, 1996; Mor & Winquist, 2002) . Conversely, individuals who are unable to control their attention are more likely to engage in depressive brooding, a thinking style which is related to increased depressive feelings (Koster et al., 2011) . Thus, this theory predicts relations between attentional control (impairments) and both reflective pondering and depressive brooding.
The available research that has investigated information processes in relation to different forms of rumination have used cross-sectional and/or correlational designs.
However, the testing of information processes underlying the entire process of stress reactivity calls for a prospective design to predict the activation of ruminative thinking during periods of life stress. This is because, when people are confronted with life stress, individual differences in information processes for emotional information may play a moderating role in the onset and course of well-defined ruminative response styles (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008) . To this end, the aim of the current study was to investigate the moderating impact of attentional control in the activation of reflective pondering and depressive brooding following a real-life stressor. To this end, we recruited a never depressed healthy sample specifically because current or past depressive episodes are associated with a markedly enhanced response to stress (for a review, see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005) . Moreover, the absence of depressive feelings increases the likelihood that we can distinguish between depressive brooding and reflective pondering (Joormann et al., 2006) .
We set up a study in a group of non-(and never) depressed students using a prospective study design with five test moments. At time one (T1), we administered an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task with angry, fearful, happy, and neutral faces as cues (ECT, Posner, 1980) . This attentional paradigm was chosen in analogue of prior prospective research investigating dysphoria and stress responses (e.g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Beevers & Carver, 2003; Fox, Cahill, Zougkou, 2010 ). In the ECT task, a target appears at one of two spatial locations, preceded by a cue at the same ("valid trial" ) or opposite location ("invalid trial" ). This task provides a means of investigating attentional biases for emotional information by calculating a Cue Validity index (CV)1. In the present study, cues were presented for either 200 ms (early attentional processing) or 1000 ms (later attentional processing). When the cue is presented for 200 ms, a faster response to valid compared to invalid trials for emotional versus neutral cues indicates that attention is more driven by the emotional stimuli (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001 ). There is a substantial body of work showing that very brief presentations of emotional facial expressions are associated with the capture of attention (for a review, see Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008 ; but see also Koster, Verschuere, Burssens, Custers, & Crombez, 2007) . When the cue is presented for a longer duration (> 1000 ms), this facilitative effect reverses because attention is drawn to new locations (the inhibition of return effect: IOR, Posner, 1980) . However, if attention dwells on or is maintained by emotional cues, the inhibition of return effect will be reduced for the emotional cues (Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) . Based on previous studies in healthy volunteers where typically effects on emotional reactivity were related to early attentional processes (e.g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Beevers & Carver, 2003; Fox et al., 2010) , we expected effects only for the 200 ms cue presentation.
Subsequently, six weeks after T1, internet questionnaires were administered during final examinations at four fixed moments in time (weeks T2-T5 during final examinations), measuring real-life stress and the response, i.e. reflective pondering and depressive brooding.
The two rumination variables are considered as independent constructs generated from the Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor et al., 2003) . For undergraduate students, final examinations are considered as stressful events. How students handle these stressors and respond with different types of rumination might be moderated by attentional biases for 1 Using the ECT, more specific components of attention -attentional engagement and disengagement -can be examined. However, some methodological problems have been noted in the analyses of these components (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008) . Therefore, we chose to limit our analyses to the cue validity component as our main index of attentional bias. emotional information. This association between attentional bias (T1) and levels of rumination over the follow-ups in times of life stress (T2-T5) should be controlled for baseline levels of trait rumination. This control for trait rumination in the multilevel models will provide an indication of the temporal variation in the relation between stress and differences in state rumination.
Overall, based on the attentional disengagement theory that specifies the role of attentional control processes on ruminative thinking (Koster et al., 2011) , two hypotheses with regard to reflective pondering and depressive brooding were tested:
1.We predicted that the association between a stressor and reports of "reflective pondering" (at T2-T5) would be larger when participants demonstrated a decreased attentional bias (i.e. decreased CV) for angry faces at T1, hypothetically because a decreased CV indicates attentional orienting away from emotional stimuli.
Disengagement from emotional information is important to engage in reflective pondering.
2. We predicted that the association between a stressor and reports of "depressive brooding" (at T2-T5) would be larger in participants with an increased attentional bias (i.e. increased CV) for angry faces at T1. This is because attention to negative emotional cues represents an inability to detract attention from negative cognitions which might facilitate depressive brooding.
We expected an effect for emotionally negative information, specifically interpersonal rejection (angry faces) (Koster et al., 2011) . In addition, based on previous work using a prospective design with a similar attentional task (MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Beevers & Carver, 2003; Fox et al., 2010) , we expected an effect for shortly presented emotional cues (200 msec.).
Methods

Participants
A total of 83 students at Ghent University (35 males and 48 females) with a mean age of 21.11 years (SD = 1.45) participated in this study. The absence of a history of a major depressive episode was confirmed using the structured Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI - Sheehan et al., 1998; Dutch version: Van Vliet, Leroy, & Van Megen, 2000) . At baseline, participants had a mean Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; see below) of 8.94 (SD = 8.66). After receiving a complete verbal description of the study, they all provided written informed consent (protocol approved by the local ethics committee of Ghent University). The students received a financial reward for their participation.
Materials
The instructions of the questionnaires administered at baseline were not changed (i.e.
"how you are feeling in general"). The instructions of all the questionnaires, administered during the stressful period, were modified to examine a period of one week between two measurements (i.e. "how you were feeling over the last week"). The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996 , Dutch translation by Van der Does, 2002) was administered to screen for depressive symptoms. The BDI-II consists of 21 multiple choice format items, measuring the presence and severity of cognitive, motivational, affective, and somatic symptoms of depression. The Adverse Events Questionnaire (AEQ) was used to measure adverse events in participants" lives. This instrument is designed specifically for a college population (for items, see Carver, 1998) and includes academic and relationship domains, occurrence of negative events in any other domain, and the accumulation of minor problems. Using a Likert-type scale from 0 to 3, participants specified for each domain how frequently they encountered life stress and difficulties (i.e. 0 = No, 1 = "Yes, this happened to me once" ; 2 = "Yes, this happened to me twice" ; 3 = "Yes, this happened to me more than twice" ). The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Dutch translation by Raes & Hermans, 2007 RRS-NL; and also Schoofs, Hermans, & Raes, 2010 ) was administered to measure rumination. Questions deal with behaviour and cognitions that people are aware of when they feel depressed. This Dutch selfreport questionnaire consists of 26 questions to which participants respond using a 4-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 = almost never, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = most of the time). A factor analysis of the RRS has identified two separate subscales that are differentially related to psychological distress (Treynor et al., 2003; Joormann et al., 2006; Takano & Tanno, 2009 ).
Reflective pondering consists of five questions assessing the degree to which individuals engage in cognitive self-regulation to reduce negative mood. More maladaptive ways of rumination, i.e. depressive brooding, include five items assessing the extent to which individuals passively focus on the reasons for their distress (Treynor et al., 2003) . Past reports indicated that all questionnaires had good psychometric qualities.
Attentional task
Attentional processing of emotional information was measured using an emotional modification of the exogenous cueing task (ECT: Posner, 1980) . The ECT was programmed using Inquisit (Millisecond Software, 2003, Version 1.33) and was run on a personal computer with a 17-inch colour screen (see Figure 2 for an outline of the ECT design).
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to two black rectangles (3 mm/2 mm, with a vertical or a horizontal orientation) that could appear on the left or right side of a fixation cross. They were informed that a cue (picture of a face) preceded the presentation of the target and that this cue was not predictive for the target location. It was emphasized attention should be directed towards a fixation cross during each trial. Depending on the orientation of the rectangles (vertical or horizontal), they were asked to press one of two assigned keys of a response box. The response labels were counterbalanced across subjects.
Before the target appeared, a picture of an angry, happy, fearful, or neutral face was presented. The location of the picture cued the spatial location of the target in 50% of the trials (valid cue) and incorrectly cued the location of the target in the other 50% of the trials (invalid cue). This valid/invalid ratio was based on previous work (Koster, De Raedt, Franck, Goeleven, & Crombez, 2005) to ensure that attentional effects were specifically related to the exogenous cues. Within trials, pictures of neutral or valenced (happy, fearful, and angry) faces appeared with equal frequency on the left and right sides of the screen. Each trial started with a fixation cross that stayed in the middle of the screen for the remainder of the trial presentation. Five hundred ms after presentation of the fixation cross, a picture of a neutral or valenced face was presented for 200 or 1000 ms (block wise). Next, after a blank screen (50 ms), the target appeared for 1500 ms or until the subject responded. Several ECT index scores for CV [3 (CV angry, CV fearful, CV happy) x 2 (200 ms, 1000 ms)] were calculated using the following formulae: (1) Cue validity index (CVi) = RT invalid cue -RT valid cue; (2) CV = CVi for emotional -CVi for neutral. As a result, a positive score on this latter score indicates enhanced attention for emotional stimuli in comparison with neutral control stimuli (e.g. higher CV indicates an enhanced attentional bias). This latter index will be used as a moderating variable in the analyses (level 2 predictor).
Participants first completed 20 practice trials, followed by two experiment blocks (200 ms and 1000 ms, counterbalanced order) each containing 104 test trials. The order of trial types (emotion -validity -target type) was random. Stimuli were taken from the "Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces" (KDEF) database (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) . Prior to selection, all pictures were adjusted to exclude interference of background stimuli (hair and clothing) so that only the face of the person was presented. In addition, all coloured pictures were adjusted to the same size (326 x 326 pixels). We chose to include angry (in the context of interpersonal rejection), fearful (in the context of perceived threat specific to examinations), and happy (in the context of positive information) faces as emotional pictures. 
Procedure
During an initial laboratory session (T1), participants completed the following baseline questionnaires: BDI-II, RRS, and the AEQ. Thereafter, an ECT task with fearful, angry, neutral, and happy faces was presented to participants. At a follow-up approximately 6 weeks later (T2-T5), all participants were preparing for and performing final examinations.
During that period, participants completed the same questionnaires as at baseline measurement in four consecutive weeks. Internet questionnaires were sent every week on Wednesday, and participants" responses were automatically emailed to a lab address after completion of an online questionnaire. Participants were instructed to complete the questionnaires on the same day or the day after receipt.
Statistical analyses
The data comprised a multilevel (or hierarchically nested) data structure with life stress reports over 4 test moments (level 1) nested within individual scores of attentional control (level 2) in order to predict rumination. We controlled for baseline levels of rumination (trait rumination) in order to estimate any temporal variation in the relationship between stress and rumination. In other words, taking into account the baseline ruminative response, we investigated whether attentional bias to emotional faces at Time 1 moderated the relationship between stressors and ruminative thinking at T2-T5. The data were analyzed with multilevel regression analyses using the HLM program (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004 ; Version 6.01). The Level-1 predictor (i.e. AEQ) was group-mean centered; Level-2 predictors (i.e. CV) were standardized and grand-mean centered to allow for comparisons across Level 2 units and for a clearer interpretation of coefficients. A full maximum likelihood estimation was used for all models. Effect sizes r were calculated according to the formula r = rD √(1 + rI/2), where rD = √(t² / t² + n-2) and rI = intraclass correlation (see Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006) . Estimates of effect size are reported: estimates of .1 are considered small, .3 medium, and .5 large (see Cohen, 1988) . The significance level was set at an alpha level of .05.
Results
Descriptives
Mean scores, standard deviation, and Cronbach" s alphas of self-report measures at all test moments are listed in Table 1 . Higher scores are indicative of higher rumination, more stressors, and more depressive symptoms respectively. Of a total of 83 subjects, 7 subjects (8.3%) did not return their questionnaires at 3 out of 4 test moments and were consequently excluded from the analyses. Of the remaining 76 participants, 7 did not return their questionnaires at one test moment, and their data were all listed as missing. Before analyzing the response latencies of the ECT, trials with errors, and latencies, more than 2.5 standard deviations beyond each participant" s mean for each data category were omitted (M=4.6%,
SD=3.5).
A data analysis of correct responses was performed on the remaining ECT data.
Mean response times for the ECT are listed in Table 2 . No correlations between each of the 6 ECT variables and baseline measures of rumination, depressive symptoms, and stress were observed (rs<.20; ps>.09). We observed no absolute differences between reports of stress across time, ps<.1.
Multi-level modeling
The dependent variables were respectively the reflective pondering and brooding scores (separate set of analysis). The Level 1 predictors (AEQ at four consecutive time points) and the level 2 predictors (6 ECT variables measured at baseline) were entered in a multilevel model to investigate the moderating effect of attentional bias upon the relationship between AEQ and ruminative thinking. Each of these multilevel models (at T2-T5) was controlled for baseline measures of reflection or brooding (at T1). Table 3 lists a full correlation matrix of all the measures included in the analysis.
Reflective pondering. The baseline model indicated that there was a significant amount of unexplained variance in participants" reflection scores as a significant chi-square associated with the variance component, χ²(72)=800.70, p<.001, was found. An inspection of the baseline model with no predictors indicated that 76% of the variance in ratings of reflective pondering was due to variation between subjects (intraclass correlation) and 24% to variation within subjects, warranting a multi-level analysis. We fully describe the results from the model with CV index for angry faces presented at 200 msec (level 2 predictor), being our hypothesized moderating variable. First, a positive relation between the level 1 predictor (AEQ) and reflection scores was observed, t(263)=2.47, p<.05. Second, no relation between the negative attentional bias and reflective pondering, t(68)=1.65, p>.05, was observed.
Furthermore, it was investigated how the Level-1 association between AEQ and reflective pondering varied as a function of the Level-2 predictor negative attentional bias (referred to as a cross-level interaction). It was found that baseline negative attentional bias (200msec) moderated the association between AEQ and reflective pondering. In particular, real-life stress was associated with reflective pondering more strongly when baseline ECT measurements showed a decreased CV specifically for angry faces SE=.16, t(263) 
Discussion
In this study, we investigated whether attention for emotionally negative information moderates the relationship between real-life stress and rumination. Based on the attentional disengagement theory (Koster et al., 2011) , differential predictions for reflective pondering and depressive brooding were tested. These hypotheses were tested in a prospective design in which the relation between stressful events and rumination was examined as predicted by attentional bias measured six weeks earlier. The present data show that (1) a specific early attentional bias for angry faces moderated the relation between stress and reflective pondering; (2) there was no moderation of attentional bias between stress and depressive brooding. These results are discussed below.
The present data demonstrate that the Cue Validity (CV) index for angry faces at T1 (baseline measurements six weeks before T2-T5) moderates the relationship between the occurrence of a stressor and the activation of reflective pondering at T2-T5. This moderation analysis was conducted during a period of final examinations, a period that is generally considered as stressful for undergraduate students. In particular, our findings demonstrate that the relation between stress and reflective pondering is stronger when participants allocate less attention to emotionally negative distractors (i.e. angry faces). Because this multilevel model was controlled for a measure of trait reflection at baseline (during a period of low stress), it provides an indication of the relation between stress on the temporal variations in reflection.
It is important to mention that, although the strongest effect was observed for angry faces, the attentional bias for fearful and happy faces also moderated (in the same direction, but at a trend level, p = .08) the relation between the amount of stress and the usage of reflective pondering. Moreover, the model demonstrated that the unique variability of attentional control for angry, fearful and sad faces was not significantly different from each other. These data indicate that for a more adaptive response to life stress, it is not only important to ignore distraction from emotionally negative information, but also attentional control over other emotional distractors seems to play a role. Using a similar attentional paradigm, Beevers, Wells, Ellis, and McGeary (2009) demonstrated that participants that are genetically vulnerable for depression had difficulties to disengage their attention from sad, fearful and happy stimuli, suggesting an increased sensitivity for emotional distractors in general. All together, it seems that an adequate regulation of emotional material in general is important in order to generate adaptive reactions in times of stress. For this, only early attentive processing of emotional information (short cue presentation times) moderated the link between stress and reflective pondering. This is in line with prior research findings in healthy volunteers with (e.g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Beevers & Carver, 2003; Fox et al., 2010) .
Interestingly, attentional bias did not moderate the relationship between distress and depressive brooding. Depressive brooding is considered a maladaptive form of self-focused attention to negative mood. This result is somewhat surprising as cross-sectional and/or correlational research has demonstrated quite strong relations between information processing bias at the level of attention and depressive brooding, even when depression levels were statistically controlled for (Joormann et al., 2006) . A possible explanation for the absence of this association may be that in cross-sectional research, individuals are typically preselected on depression scores and therefore include individuals with quite high depression as well as depressive brooding scores. In contrast, in our study, individuals with heightened depression scores or former depressive episodes were not included. Another possible explanation is that brooding might be more related to the control over internal stimuli but not to the control over external stimuli. Indeed, the ECT assesses attentional biases for external stimuli (externally presented emotional faces), whereas brooding might result from an inability to control attentional stimuli with respect to internal stimuli (e.g. mental events, cognitions, updating working memory) (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010) . Using a similar design in healthy volunteers (not pre-selected on depression scores), we observed that attentional control for internal emotionally negative stimuli moderated the relation between life stress and increased use of depressive brooding (De Lissnyder et al., in press ). In this latter study, no effects for reflective pondering were observed. Future research should test whether reflective pondering and depressive brooding might uniquely be associated with attentional control for respectively externally and internally presented stimuli.
Finally, it could be that the nature of the stressor (a performance based stressor) more strongly elicited reflective pondering rather than depressive brooding, with the latter perhaps being more easily triggered by interpersonal stress.
In this context it is also noteworthy that the stress level in the "stress phases" (T2, T3, etc.) seems lower (although not significantly,) as compared to the stress level at baseline (T1). Indeed, the mean reported levels of stress were not elevated from T1 to T5, which could suggest that the exam stress as studied here did not act as a highly significant stressor.
However, the AEQ was used to assess the number of events perceived as stressful that a person encountered during the last week, which asks for well defined stressful events.
Although the exams are generally considered to be quite stressful, it might be that students don" t experience many different well defined, isolated stress events during their exams, but rather consider it as one general stressor. Nevertheless, in the present study, the absolute number of stressful events (the mean over all participants) is of less interest compared to the relation between these stress levels and reports of brooding and reflection. Moreover, we observed a positive relation between reports of stress (by the AEQ) and reports of reflective pondering (first step of our HLM analysis in reflection). However, in future studies it might be better to use questionnaires that measure the levels of (dis)tress instead of the number of well defined stressful events.
The current research findings speak to a number of applied issues. The current findings in healthy volunteers suggest that an attention for emotional information appears to influence the magnitude of reflective pondering upon stress. Reflection has been found to predict emotional well-being over time, and this thinking pattern might indicate some kind of "adaptive" response to stress in non-depressed healthy individuals. In other words, the ability the overcome distraction from emotional material in the environment appears to play a significant role in the activation of reflective pondering in times of life stress. In the example of the discussion with one" s spouse, problem solving thinking will be augmented when that person is able to focus on what is goal relevant (solve the discussion) and not be captured by his/her emotions. Therefore, it would be important to practice attentional control to disengage from emotional distractors which, based on the current research findings, may increase the use of more self-controlling thinking in response to stress. For instance, it has been shown that training programs aimed at modifying attentional control to reduce vigilance for social threat result in lower self-reported stress during a period of final examinations (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007) .
It is important to mention that high and low attentional bias for angry faces seems to differ mainly in the association between low stress and reflective pondering (see figure 3 for this cross level interaction). Nevertheless, the cross level slope for low attentional bias was significantly different between low and high measures of stress, whereas the slope for high attentional bias was not. Reflective thinking in people with higher bias was not reactive on stress. This indicates that only those participants who demonstrated low attentional bias at baseline engaged less in reflective thinking under low stress (when reflective thinking might be considered not to be necessary) but more under high stress. This interpretation is in line with the disengagement theory of Koster et al. (2011) , where attentional control for negative information is seen as the process underlying the cognitive product of rumination during stressful events.
There are some limitations to the current study. A first drawback is the decreased generalizability of our results, because only healthy, never depressed students were included.
This selection resulted in a restriction of range in the depressive brooding scores and might explain the absent findings in brooding upon stress. Future research should therefore include a longitudinal study using a larger sample in order to replicate and specify these results for different types of ruminative thinking. A second limitation of the current study is that, although this is in line with most of the other studies using this attentional paradigm, the reliability of the attentional bias index is low. The choice of this task is nonetheless in analogue with many other prospective studies looking at stress, dysphoria and rumination (e.g., MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Beevers & Carver, 2003; Fox et al., 2010) . Moreover, our results partially confirm our a-priori predictions, which attests to the validity of our attention task. As a final limitation, we used only one measurement of attentional bias and so it is questionable whether the bias remained stable over time. For the current prospective study, this is however important because the attentional bias serves a predictor at the level of the individuals and is considered to remain stable over times of life stress. However, there is no data in the current study design to back-up this claim. Research findings of other studies from our lab however suggest that the attentional bias index remains stable over time (after one hour, but also after one week) (De Raedt et al., 2010; Vanderhasselt, Baeken, Hendrickx, De Raedt, 2011) . Still, we advise future prospective studies to measure attentional control for emotional information again at the end of the study to detect possible changes.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our results show that, in a group of healthy, never depressed students, attentional control to disengage from emotional information moderates the relationship between stress and reflective pondering. These findings provide key Note. Regression equation: Yij = β0j + β1j(AEQ) + rij, with β0j = γ00 + γ01(trait reflective pondering or trait depressive brooding) + γ02(Attentional bias) + u0j, β1j = γ10 + γ11(Attentional bias). 
